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Available online 3 April 2011The ability to generate and sustain an internal train of thought unrelated to external reality
frees an agent from the constraints of only acting on immediate, environmentally triggered
events. The current paper proposes that such thought is produced through cooperation
between autobiographical information provided by the default mode network and a frontal–
parietal control network which helps sustain and buffer internal trains of thought against
disruptionby the externalworld.Thishypothesisexplainsat least two featuresof the literature
on internally guided thought. First, access to the top-down control system is a generally
accepted prerequisite of conscious experience; this explainswhy activation of this systemand
default mode activity is often observed together during periods of internally guided thought.
Second,because the top-downattentional control systemhasa limitedcapacity, internallyand
externally driven streams can come into conflict, with the result that perceptual information
must be denied attentional amplification if the internal stream is to be maintained. This
explains why internal thought is routinely associated with a state of perceptual decoupling,
reflected in both measured anticorrelations between the default mode network and sensory
areas and the manner in which task unrelated thoughts compromise task performance. This
paper offers a hypothesis that should help to constrain and guide interpretations,
investigations, and analyses of the neural processes involved in internally driven cognition.
This article is part of a Special Issue entitled Special Issue The Cognitive Neuroscience.
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vacation, preparing for an upcoming meeting while showering,
or solving a Sudoku puzzle on the train to work, consciousness
often neglects immediate perceptual input to focus on an
internal train of thought. The significance of this was not lost
onWilliam Jameswhen he suggested his well-known definition
of attention: “Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking
possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of
what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of
thought” (James, 1890, p. 403–404, emphasis added). Experience
sampling studies confirm that internal trains of thought make
up a significant proportion of cognition, with estimates suggest-
ing that asmuch as 30% of a person's time is engaged internally
(Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Kane et al., 2007). Despite this
fact, cognitive neuroscience research in the last century has
largely focused on expanding our understanding of how
externally oriented attention operates (Corbetta and Shulman,
2002; Posner and Petersen, 1990).
In the last decade, however, our understanding of how
attention bears on internally generated thoughts has seen rapid
growth, largely becauseof apuzzling observation fromcognitive
neuroscience that a coordinated system of brain regions, later
dubbed the ‘default mode network’ (DMN, Raichle et al., 2001)
shows increased activity when individuals have no demanding
perceptual task to perform. The core brain areas of this network
include the ventral medial pre-frontal cortex (vMPFC), the
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), the inferior parietal lobule
(IPL), the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) and the
hippocampal formation (HF) (for a review see Buckner et al.,
2008). Buckner and colleagues have suggested that the DMN is a
coherent systemwhich includes twomain hubs: i) the PCC, and
ii) the MPFC. The dMPFC and HF are also both correlated with
other regions of the DMN; it is now thought that the HF and
dMPFC are two distinct subsystems that are connected to the
two hubs of the larger DMN.
Despite general agreement that the DMN is associated with
stimulus independent cognition (Buckner et al., 2008), debate
continues on the specific role the DMN plays. Can extensive
DMN activity be attributed solely to spontaneous thought or is
the activation too broad for such a purpose (Raichle, 2009;
Raichle and Snyder, 2007)? Does the DMN aid in the generation
of internal trains of thought or is thismerely an epiphenomenal
feature of a system that provides vigilance during lapses of
external attention (Gilbert et al., 2007)? Are default processes
functional, serving operations such as autobiographical plan-
ning (Smallwood et al., 2009, 2011; Smallwood, 2010; Spreng
et al., 2010) or does the association of the DMN with errors and
mental illness indicate that such processes are simply mal-
adaptive (Broyd et al., 2009; McVay and Kane, 2010)?
One reason why the role of the DMN in normal waking
thought remains relativelymysteriousmay be due to the lack
of an overarching framework which integrates both inter-nally and externally driven trains of thought in a unified
manner (although see Burgess et al., 2007; Sonuga-Barke and
Castellanos, 2007). The starting point for this review is the
hypothesis that the ability to engage in an internal train of
thought involves two processes: (i) spontaneous generation
of mental contents (aka mental simulation) that are unre-
lated to direct perceptual input and arise principally from the
autobiographical memory system (e.g. Schacter and Addis,
2007), and (ii) the engagement of top-down control in order to
buffer and sustain this activity over time so that cognition
can proceed in an orderly manner (e.g. Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006). Given that the role of top-down processes
in spontaneous thought is amatter of debate (e.g. McVay and
Kane, 2010); Box 1 presents three potential similarities
between the engagement of an internally guided train of
thought and processes which are traditionally viewed as
elements of top-down control.1. Integrating top-down control and the default
mode network (DMN): a global workspace model of
internally guided thought
This paper extends a framework for spontaneous thought
couched purely in information processing terms (Smallwood,
2010;SmallwoodandSchooler, 2006) and isanattempt toembed
the DMN in the architecture of a broad class of theories known
as global workspace accounts of consciousness (Baars, 1988).
Global workspace models have been presented for different
attentional states (Baars et al., 2003), and tasks (Dehaene et al.,
1998), and there is support for suchmodels among the cognitive
(Baars, 2002), neuroscientific (Dehaene et al., 2006), artificial
intelligence (Shanahan, 2006; Shanahan and Baars, 2005) and
philosophical communities (Dennett, 2001).
The neuronal global workspace theory hypothesizes that
consciousness is produced through the interaction between
neural submodules, which encapsulate specific sub processes
(such as perception or language), and a multimodal limited
capacity global workspace that allows communication between
the different subsystems. This global workspace is hypothe-
sized to involve a neural network composed of “a distributed set
of cortical neurons characterized by their ability to receive from
and send back to homologous neurons in other cortical areas
horizontal projections through long-range excitatory axons
(whichmay impingeoneither excitatory or inhibitory neurons)”
(Dehaene et al., 1998, p. 14529). Global workspace theory
assumes that different mental contents (represented by the sub
modules) compete for access to the workspace with conscious
thought being associated with the winner. The stability of the
conscious content is ensured because the global workspace has
the capacity to amplify those input streams that are currently in
the global workspace.
Box 1
Three similarities between and internal train of thought and the
process and functions of top-down control.
Top-downcontrol influenceshowvarious lower level stimulus-
driven processes operate and so involves operations on
information that is abstract.
The engagement of an internally guided train of thought
depends less upon external physical referents for cognition
than does perceptually guided cognition. As a relatively greater
level of abstraction is required to represent informationwhich is
independent from perceptual input (Amodio and Frith, 2006),
the neural representations that are involved in internally guided
thought may be more abstract than those involved in
perceptually guided thought. Given that these representations
themselves are of relatively high levels of abstraction, they
could be capable of exerting downstream influence in amanner
that may be analogous to top-down control.
Top-down control functions ensure that information flow
proceeds along the lines of the current goal and does so by
inhibiting irrelevant information processes.
During periods of internally guided thought, information
processing is biased against the processing of perceptual
information. This process of perceptual decoupling indicates
that information flow within the brain is being biased in favor
of relevant input (e.g. internally generated information
related to the internal train of thought) rather than irrelevant
input (in this case perception). This decoupling is not
permanent; instead attention can be rapidly recoupled to
perceptual events if salient external events occur (e.g.
Smallwood et al., 2006). Nonetheless during the experience
of internally generated thought, irrelevant external informa-
tion is suppressed in a manner that may be analogous to the
way that external distractions are suppressed during
successful task performance.
Top-down control systemsmust have the necessary plasticity
to be able to react to the changing goal demands faced by an
agent.
While it is true that certain clinical disorders exhibit especially
repetitive types of thought, on the whole the contents of
spontaneous thought are related to the changing goal states of
the individual, knownas their current concerns (Klinger, 1999).
For example, studies have demonstrated that the contents of
consciousness are focused on upcoming personally salient
events, indicating that they may play a role in the process of
autobiographical planning (Smallwood et al., 2009; Morsella
et al., 2010). This coupling between the current concerns of
the individual and the contents of consciousness suggests that
the experiences that oftenmake up the internal train of thought
are responsive to the changing situations of the individual
which itself is a characteristic of top-down processes.
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rience (i.e. an externally guided train of thought), features of the
global workspace architecture are also applicable to internally
mediated conscious thought. A simulated neural network
consisting of multiple submodules coupled to a shared pool of
nodes (the shared pool representing the global workspace)
showed that the access of external information into the shared
poolwasblockedduringperiodsof spontaneous,non-externally
triggered activity (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005). Dehaene and
Changeuxmade two predictions on the dynamics of spontane-
ous thought in this particular architecture: (1) cortical areas
particularly rich in ‘workspace neurons’ (i.e. prefrontal, parietal,superior temporal, and cingulate cortices) would exhibit the
most consistent spontaneous activity during awake, conscious
thought, and (2) spontaneous activitywill block external stimuli
from accessing the global workspace, limiting perceptual
processing to the level of local sub networks. The current
framework extends this basic hypothesis by suggesting that the
DMNacts as an additional hub in the globalworkspace thatmay
be engaged when conscious thought follows particular types of
internally guided trains of thought.
Evidence suggests that this “global neuronal workspace”
may rely in part upon on what has become known as the
frontal–parietal network (FPN) (Corbetta et al., 2008; Vincent
et al., 2008; Posner and Dehaene, 1994). Connectivity analysis
derived from resting state scans (e.g. Spreng et al., 2010;
Vincent et al., 2008) has defined the FPN as including the
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (rlPFC), middle frontal gyrus
(mFG), anterior insula/frontal operculum(AI/FO), dorsal ante-
rior cingulate cortex (dACC), precuneus (PCU), the caudate
nucleus (CN), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dLPFC) and
the anterior inferior parietal lobule (aIPL). The PCU, an area
with robust connections to the PCC and often observed to be
active at rest, may or may not be included in the DMN due to
its involvement inmotor coordination and planning and other
features of control (Buckner et al., 2008, see also Margulies
et al., 2009). Other areas which could be involved in cognitive
control include the inferior frontal gyrus (iFG) given its role in
tasks requiring control (e.g. Smith and Jonides, 1999), although
many consider it to be a component of the DMN. Studies of
resting state connectivity suggest that the FPN shows a
pattern of functional connectivity that is distinct from both
the DMN and the dorsal attention network (DAN) (Spreng
et al., 2010; Vincent et al., 2008). The DAN has extensive
connections to the visual cortex (e.g. V1–V4) and includes the
intra-parietal sulcus (IPS), frontal eye-fields (FEF), dorsal
parietal cortex (DPC) and the pre-central sulcus (PCS) (Corbetta
et al., 2008).
Recent discussions of the FPN suggest that it has several
properties in common with the conceptualization of a global
workspace hypothesized by Dehaene and colleagues. First,
its anatomical location between the DMN and the DAN means
the FPN “may be uniquely positioned to adjudicate between
potentially competing inner- versus outer-directed processes”
(Vincent et al., 2008). Second, the FPN is thought to help shift
attentional focus and protect from disruption when resources
are allocated to perceptual, memory, or self-referential proces-
sing (Corbetta et al., 2008). Other authors have suggested that a
similar system to the FPN serves to maintain information
content that is necessary for task performance on timescales of
seconds (Dosenbach et al., 2008). Together, these recent views
can be seen as a more neurally specified examples of the
following claim associated with the functions of the global
workspace: “parietal and cingulate areas contribute to the
attentional gating and shiftingof the focus of interest” (Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001).
Fig. 1 presents a schematic of how the FPN could work in
conjunction with both perceptual information from the DAN
and autobiographical information provided by the DMN to
selectively reinforce either internal or external trains of
thought. The upper panel presents a schematic description
of how perceptual and autobiographical information can be
Fig. 1 – A schematized architecture outlining how internal and external trains of thought can arise in a global workspacemodel
of the brain. The upper panel presents an example of the proposed architecture for both internally and externally generated
thought. The lower left hand panel describes the neural activationwhich is hypothesized to occurwhen attention focuses on an
internal train of thought. The lower right hand panel presents the neural activation that is hypothesized to occur during an
external train of thought. The frontal parietal network (FPN) is represented in green, the default mode network (DMN) is
represented in blue, and the dorsal attention network (DAN) in red. Note these locations areas are displayed for diagrammatic
purposes only. List of regions: anterior insula/frontal operculum (AI/FO), anterior cingulate (aCC), Dorso-lateral pre-frontal
cortex (dlPFC), medial Frontal Gyrus (MFG), medial Prefronal Cortex (mpFC), medial Temporal Lobe (mTL), posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC), PCU Precuneus, rostro-lateral prefrontal cortex (rlPFC), Posterior Parietal Cortex (PPC) and Visual Cortex (VC).
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dynamic architecture of the global workspace. The blue areas
indicate brain areas involved in the DMN. The red areas
indicate aspects of the visual perceptual system that are
integrated with the DAN1. Areas involved in the FPN (colored
green) form a ‘global workspace’ with the capacity to receive
information from either of the submodules.
The hypothesis that the FPN and the DMN cooperate to
produce the internal train of thought leads to two specific
predictions (see also Dehaene and Changeux, 2005). First,
situations when consciousness is internally focused should
engage both the DMN and elements of the FPN. Second,
periods of internally guided thought should be accompanied
by a process of ‘perceptual decoupling’ in which sensory
information from the DAN is blocked from the global work-
space and so is not processed with the same detail as when
the control system is required to focus on the external world.
One important feature of this state of perceptual decoupling is
that it may help insulate an internally maintained train of
thought from being disrupted by events in the external world.
The two lower panels each represent different configurations
of the system that illuminate how these different predictions
unfold within a simplified architecture. Each panel corre-
sponds to different situations engaging either internally
guided (B) or externally guided (C) conscious thought. When
consciousness is focused internally (B), information generated1 For simplicity this schematic only focuses on visual perception
but the proposal generalizes to all forms of perceptual information.by the DMN gains access to the FPN, biasing attention away
from concurrent visual input. In the case of an external train of
thought (C), the FPN cooperates with the DAN, leading
attention to be biased away from the DMN. The blocking of
the DMN during states of detailed external focus helps ensure
that when control is directed to the external world, externally
guided cognition can proceed without disruption. In both
panels, darker, opaque colors indicate amplification of the
relevant submodules.
1.1. Prediction 1: conscious internal thought involves
cooperation between elements of the DMN and the FPN
Initial support for a link between the DMN and internally
generated thought was based on hypotheses about the psycho-
logical processes active during rest (e.g. Binder et al., 1999;
Gusnard et al., 2001). In one of the earliest experiments which
specifically explored the neural substrates of spontaneous
thought, McGuire et al. (1997) used positron emission tomogra-
phy (PET) to measure brain activity while participants per-
formed cognitive tasks and later reported the extent of task
unrelated thought (TUT) experienced; activity in a portion of the
mPFCwasassociatedwith the level of TUT.Along similar lines a
recent study by Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010) inwhich internally
generated thought was measured retrospectively revealed that
the MTL component of the DMN was associated with stimulus
independent thoughts regarding the future or the past.
More recent studies have documented manipulations that
increase both DMN activity and TUT. A study by Mason et al.
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memory tasks for several days. Training increased the extent
of TUT (measured outside of the scanner) and activation in
elements of the DMN (including aspects of the mPFC). Using a
similar rationale, McKiernan et al. (2006) measured fMRI
activity while varying a number of task parameters including
rate of presentation and target discriminability. Both speed of
presentation and task difficulty led to correlated changes in
TUT reports (assessed outside of the scanner) and activity in a
number of DMN structures.
Evidence that the conditions that promote activity in the
DMN also increase TUT does not guarantee that both reflect the
same psychological process (Gilbert et al., 2007). Evidence that
activity in the DMN occurs during episodes of TUTwas provided
by Christoff et al. (2009) who measured TUT online during fMRI
scanning. Elements of the DMN (including the mPFC and PCC)
showed greater activity in periods when participants reported
that theywere engaged inTUT thanwhen theywere focused on
the task. Fig. 2 presents a comparison of the Mason et al. and
Christoff et al. studies described previously. The left hand panel
shows a statistical parametricmap for areasmore active during
practiced versus non-practiced task blocks in the Mason et al.
study. The right hand panel shows areas more active during
periods of TUT in the Christoff et al. study. It is apparent that
similar areas of the mPFC and PCC are recruited in both
nondemanding tasks (Left panel) and during transient experi-
ences of TUT (Right panel).
A recent study by Stawarczyk et al. (2011) replicated the
observation that elements of the DMN are more active
during periods of TUT. One important advance in this study
was the deployment of thought probes that separated the
stimulus independent and task unrelated components of off-
task thought. This more fine grained analysis indicated that
the lateral temporal regions of the DMN were specifically
related to reports of stimulus independent mentation rather
than TUT. This finding suggests that one important question
facing future studies of internally guided thought and/or theFig. 2 – A comparison of the neural recruitment during task unre
fromMason et al., 2007) or an event related design (Panel B, adapt
activations are observed in both hubs of the default mode the me
the data from Christoff et al. reveals activations in the dorsal aCC,
the FPN can also be active during mind-wandering.DMN is assessment of whether the DMN can be further
subdivided into different constituent processes (see also
Buckner et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010).
The model proposed in this paper suggests that coopera-
tion between the DMN and a system such as the FPN is
necessary to produce an internal train of thought. Mason et al.
observed greater precuneus activity when participants per-
formed practiced task blocks. Further analysis indicated that
this activation was most pronounced in individuals who
reported frequent daydreaming. Likewise, the PCU and
elements of the dorsal ACC were all active during periods of
off-task thought in the data of Christoff et al. PCU activation
was also observed in periods of mind wandering in the study
by Stawarczyk et al. (2011). Likewise, the PCU, the IFG and
elements of the dorsal ACC were all active during periods of
off-task thought in the data of Christoff et al. PCU and bilateral
IFG activationwas also observed in periods ofmindwandering
in the study by Stawarczyk et al. (2011). Finally, a recent
study (Dumontheil et al., 2010) demonstrated that activity in
aspects of the FPN (including the rlPFC) showed a U-shaped
relationship to task demands; enhanced activity was seen in
both easy tasks (corresponding to the conscious processing of
internally generated thought) and in difficult ones (corre-
sponding to the conscious processing of task relevant
information). Together this data from awide range of different
research groups and using several different measures of
spontaneous thought support the hypothesis that circum-
stances that encourage TUT not only recruit the DMN, they
often also engage elements of a control system such as the
FPN.
If activity in the DMN and the FPN is in cooperation then
they should not simply be activated at the same time; these
different networks should also demonstrate functional con-
nectivity. Initial support for this assumption was demonstrat-
ed by Smallwood et al. (2009, 2011) who demonstrated that
engaging in a task requiring control reduced the occurrence of
auto biographical planning. The strongest evidence that thelated thought using either a blocked design (Panel A, adapted
ed from Christoff et al., 2009). It can be seen that in both cases
dial PFC and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). In addition,
a part of the frontal–parietal network, providing evidence that
Box 2
Three reasons why internally guided thought involves a state of
perceptual decoupling.
Reason 1: Internally guided thought does not depend
directly on perception.
The content of an internal train of thought is the product of
the autobiographical system (e.g. Schacter and Addis,
2007). This reliance of internal trains of thought on memorial
content means that concurrent perceptual information has
less direct relevance than if cognition is focused on an
external event. Given that internally derived thought can
proceed without perceptual input, there is no principled
reason to expect sensory information to be processed in any
degree of detail.
Reason 2: Conscious experience has limited capacity.
One notable feature of conscious experience is that it is
serial; it becomes diminished when attention is divided
between many items or tasks. One implication of this
relatively limited capacity is that engagement in one input
stream requires that other streams be neglected. Once it is
recognized that consciousness can focus on an internally
generated input stream in a detailed manner, it follows that
other input streams (in this case perception) would be
neglected.
Reason 3: Internally generated thought must be buffered
from the distractions of the external environment
Often in psychological experiments irrelevant distracting
information is a feature of the external task (e.g. the
incongruent color information in the Stroop task, (Stroop,
2004)). When engaged in a daydream, however, perceptual
events are irrelevant to the specific train of thought that is
being followed. To an agent attempting to daydream, the
success with which an internally generated train of thought
is maintained depends in part upon the extent to which the
distracting input of the external environment is suppressed.
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thought, however, can be seen in a study of the neural
processes involved in autobiographical planning (Spreng et al.,
2010). Spreng et al. asked participants to either engage in a
task of autobiographical planning (“How can I get out of
debt?”) or a visuo-spatial planning task (the Tower of London
test (Shalice, 1982)). Both planning tasks recruited the FPN
relative to a simple counting control. The FPN showed greater
connectivity with the DAN under situations when participants
engaged in visuo-spatial planning. Critically, however, con-
nectivity analysis indicated that elements of the DMN showed
enhanced connectivity with elements of the FPN when
participants engaged in conscious autobiographical planning.
The data of Spreng and colleagues indicates autobiographical
planning depends upon cooperation between the FPN and the
DMN; these processes are also routinely found to compose the
content of TUT (Smallwood et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2011;
Smallwood and O'Connor, in press). The observation that
autobiographical planning occupies a significant proportion of
the internal train of thought and depends upon the FPN
provides strong construct validity for the claim that sponta-
neous task unrelated experiences can be implicated in the
process of executive control (e.g. Smallwood, 2010).
1.2. Prediction 2: engaging the internal stream of thought
dampens sensory processing
One of the most common metaphors for attention is that of a
spotlight which amplifies relevant over irrelevant input (Posner
and Petersen, 1990; Posner and Dehaene, 1994). While usually
focused on different modalities of perception (such as
auditory versus visual), the current framework assumes that
the spotlight of attention can also focus internally. A focus of
attention on an internal input stream necessarily denies
amplification to other input streams (in this case all percep-
tual information, e.g. Ray and Coles, 1985) leading to an
association between internal thought and the state of
perceptual decoupling (Smallwood et al., 2003). This is
predicted by the global workspace architecture because
according to that framework spontaneous activity and exter-
nal input streams are in competition for the same shared
resource (such as the FPN) (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005).
An important feature of theprocess ofperceptual decoupling
is that it allows the consideration of information that is not
present in the immediate environment and instead is derived
largely from memory (e.g. imaginative thought). Decoupling
frees consciousness from the constraints of attending to the
hereandnow, allowing theagent the chance to “avoid theworld
of actions and sensations, and stay in the subjective world of
desires and feelings” (Frith, 2007, p. 105). One of the many
situations where decoupling serves a necessary function is in
mental state attribution. One such example is the “Sally Ann” task
used in assessing theory of mind in children (Wimmer and
Perner, 1983), in which successful performance requires a focus
on mental representations that are at odds with current
physical reality (where Sally thinks the marble is, rather than
where it is now). Meta-analysis suggests that the decoupling
involved in theory ofmind is similar to thatwhichoccursduring
internally guided thought; both recruit similar neural substrates
involving elements of the DMN (Gallagher and Frith, 2003;Spreng, Mar and Kim, 2008, see also Spreng and Grady, 2010).
Box 2 summarizes three reasons why an internal train of
thought often involves a state of perceptual decoupling.
There is now abundant evidence that attention is decoupled
from perception during the engagement of an internal train of
thought. For example, the occurrence of TUT during memory
tasks reduces a participant's ability to recall information that
was concurrently presented. An example of this absent minded
forgetting is presented in Fig. 3 (Upper right panel)where it canbe
seen thatword recallwas significantly less accuratewhen those
words were encoded during periods of TUT (Smallwood et al.,
2003). Similarly, reading comprehension is impaired when the
participant drifts off task and engages in mindless reading (see
Smallwood, 2011 for a more detailed review). Fig. 3 (Upper left
panel) illustrates this effect in the context of reading a detective
novel. Participants who engaged in TUT during periods when
the author revealed a fact relevant to solving a crime (red bar)
were less likely to solve the crime than those who were on task
when reading the clues (blue bar, Smallwood et al., 2008c). Other
studies demonstrated abnormal reading times associated with
such mindless reading during narrative comprehension
(Raichle et al., 2001) coupled with a greater blinking rate
(Smilek et al., 2010a,b). The effects of decoupling are also
apparent in other tasks. TUT leads to errors during sustained
Fig. 3 – Examples of behavioral and subjective indicators of perceptual decoupling during internally generated thought. The
upper panels present behavioral consequences of decoupling in two common situations for studying internal thought:
(A) during TUT encoding suffers from absent-minded forgetting (adapted fromSmallwood et al., 2007) and (B)while reading TUT
leads to mindless reading (adapted from Smallwood et al., 2008a). The lower panel presents event-related potential evidence
for decoupling based on the extent to which task relevant information is suppressed by TUT. Both task representations as
indexed by the amplitude of the P3 (adapted from Smallwood et al., 2008b) and sensory ERPs (adapted fromKam et al., 2010) are
reduced during periods of TUT.
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Smallwoodetal., 2004; Smallwoodet al., 2007) andcompromises
the generation of random numbers (Teasdale et al., 1995).
EEG studies provide a sensitive indicator of perceptual
decoupling because the examination of the magnitude of
event related potentials (ERPs) allow the level of information
processing of external perceptual events to be quantified. ERPs
are calculated by averaging the brain's response to external
events that are processed during a period of task performance.
By comparing the magnitude of the ERPs during periods of
externally and internally guided thought it is possible to
explicitly test the idea that perceptual decoupling occurs
when attention is directed internally. As can be seen in the
lower left panel of Fig. 3, the P3 event related potential (ERP) to
a target, recorded at the midline central and parietal
electrodes, showed reduced amplitude during periods of TUT
relative to periods of task focus (Smallwood et al., 2008c). In a
more recent study (Kam et al., 2010) sensory processing was
measured by the cortical response to task-irrelevant events
(such as a visual grating or an auditory beep). An example of
the data from Kam and colleagues is presented in the lower
left panel of Fig. 3, which shows the task-irrelevant sensory
ERP recorded at a central electrode over the occipital cortex. In
this panel, it can be seen that the amplitude of the visual
response occurring in the first 100 ms after the event is larger
during periods of task focus (red) than during TUT (blue). The
same study showed that auditory processing (measured by N1amplitude) was also reduced during TUT. Other studies have
documented that TUT reduces the processing of both task
relevant and distracter events in a task (Barron et al., 2011)
indicating that the state of decoupling reduces external
attention and yet can be distinct from a state of distractibility.
Finally, the perceptual decoupling that occurs when the mind
wanders interferes with the processing of external events
even when there is no external task at all (Brabosczcz and
Delorme, 2010). Taken together this growing body of evidence
using ERPs confirms a key tenet of the decoupling hypothesis:
detailed internal mentation that is at odds with perceptual
input dampens the processing of external information.
Parallel evidence for perceptual decoupling comes from
studies of DMN functional connectivity and investigations of
the neural precursors to error. Studies indicate decreased
activation in several areas of the sensory cortices occurs
during periods when the DMN is active. Following the
observations of Greicius and Menon (2004) this has led to the
notion of anticorrelation between the DMN and the task-
positive DAN network (e.g. Fox et al., 2005; Fransson, 2005;
Vincent et al., 2008). This anticorrelation can also interfere
with the performance of demanding tasks. A growing number
of studies have documented that the DMN is especially active
during periods prior to errors or lengthy response times on
tasks that depend upon a detailed cognitive analysis (e.g.
Eichele et al., 2008; Christoff et al., 2009; Weissman et al., 2006)
and leads to absent minded forgetting (e.g. Kim, 2010). These
Box 3
Outstanding questions on the neuro-cognitive basis of the internal
train of thought.
Do all varieties of internally generated conscious thoughts
engage the same neural substrates?
There are likely to be many different types of internally
generated trains of thought that individuals can engage in.
One limitation of the current account is that it may be most
applicable to those processes that are employed in a specific
type of autobiographical planning. Although a common form
of spontaneous thought, other varieties of thought could
engage different neural substrates, such as those involved in
person perception (e.g. Mason and Macrae, 2004; Hoffman
and Haxby, 2000), emotion (Adolphs, 2002), or empathy
(Singer et al., 2004).
What is the significance of activity in the DMN when
attention is not engaged in an internal train of thought?
Studies indicate that DMN activity can continue (albeit in an
altered manner) in situations in which the opportunity for
conscious internal thought is substantially reduced (Esposito
et al., 2006). Whether unattended information is pre-
conscious or unconscious can be addressed in a straightfor-
ward manner for perception, but novel methods will be
needed to experimentally assess how to categorize DMN
activity which is not globally available.
What is the fate of external events that are presented during
perceptual decoupling?
While explicit recollection is impaired, certain features of
stimulus processing may be preserved, raising the possibility
that external events could indirectly prime the contents of
the internal train of thought. Recently, Miles and colleagues
demonstrated that the temporal focus of mind-wandering is
influenced by the direction of task-irrelevant apparent
motion (Miles et al., 2010). Identifying whether external
events can lead to priming during TUT is a important
question for future research.
What is the time course of internally generated thought?
Studies of the low frequency fluctuations in the DMN
(Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos, 2007) and behavioral pre-
cursors of attentional lapses (Eichele et al., 2008) indicate
that internally generated thoughts are associated with
changes on the timescale of seconds and so are distinct
from much shorter lapses such as the attentional blink
(Shapiro et al., 1997).
Why does the mind wander?
The current framework focuses on how an internal train of
thought is produced; it does not explain why the mind
wanders. Within the literature there are three proposed
explanations for why these shifts occur: 1) mind-wandering
occurs because suppressed mental contents become more
accessible (Wegner, 2009), 2) mind-wandering may occur
because of an intermittent failure to re-represent the
contents of consciousness (known as meta-awareness.
(Schooler, 2002)) and 3) lapses in ‘control’ allow the mind
to escape from the constraints of what it is doing (McVay
and Kane, 2010). Further research is needed to assess
whether in isolation or in combination these different
explanations can account for the emerging cognitive
neuroscience data on spontaneous thought.
67B R A I N R E S E A R C H 1 4 2 8 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 6 0 – 7 0observed anticorrelations between the DMN and sensory
systems, along with the association of DMN activity with task
errors, not only parallels the results of the study of TUT but also
provides further support for thenotion that the engagementof a
detailed internal train of thought is accompanied by an absence
of a detailed focus on the external world (i.e. perceptual
decoupling). Importantly, this mutual inhibition between per-
ception and internal thoughtwould emerge naturally within an
architecture such as that described in this paper in which both
input streams compete for access to a shared pool of resources
(such as the global workspace).
1.3. Future directions
In order to escape from the constraints placed on it by the
environment, the mind must be able to both generate sponta-
neous mental contents which are unrelated to perception and
coordinate these experiences so that they aremaintained in the
face of competing sensory information. The current account
proposes that the internal train of thought isproducedwhen the
DMN (providing theautobiographical content) cooperateswitha
control network (such as the FPN) which helps in either the
coordination of these thoughts themselves or by buffering this
internal stream against disruption by perception. This cooper-
ation explains why the neural recruitment associated with
spontaneous thought engages elements of both the DMN and
FPN systems. Moreover, assigning to the FPN at least part of the
function of the “global workspace” explains why spontaneous
thought and perceptual decoupling co-occur; perceptual and
spontaneous information compete for limited workspace
resources.
While the data reviewed are consistent with the proposed
hypothesis, research which specifically focuses on both the
generation of the internal train of thought and the implica-
tions of this state for ongoing perception is still scarce and
further work is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn.
Moreover, the present framework is intentionally general and
therefore leaves many important questions unanswered (see
Box 3). One overarching question, given the recognized
contribution of elements of the DMN (such as the mPFC) to
processes such as mental state attribution (e.g. Gallagher and
Frith, 2003; Mitchell, 2010) is whether cooperation between the
DMN and the FPN may also support the capacity to sustain a
detailed simulation of the goals and desires of other people.
Notwithstanding such limitations, the current hypothesis
provides a framework which can usefully constrain future
research. According to the current proposal, for example,
situations that prohibit the opportunity for a detailed internal
train of thought may do so because of involvement of the FPN
in the external task. In such an experiment the FPN may well
be equally engaged in both internally and externally guided
thought but is critically focused on different input streams;
this can be seenmost clearly in the data of Spreng et al. (2010).
In this context, comparisons between conditions will illumi-
nate the neural processes that differ (e.g. the involvement of
the DMN) but will obscure any similarities (because the FPN is
engaged in either the external task or the internal train of
thought). By contrast, the use of experience sampling probes
online during fMRI scanning allows the comparison of
situations when participants' attend to the performance of asimple task (which may not recruit the FPN) with periods of
internally focused cognition (which we argue should involve
the FPN). This is one possible reason why studies that used
68 B R A I N R E S E A R C H 1 4 2 8 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 6 0 – 7 0thought sampling observed recruitment in areas associated
with control, e.g. the dLPFC and ACC (Christoff et al., 2009) and
those that have been implicated in both DMN and control
(such as the IFG, Christoff et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011).
By contrast, studies which compared situations that do and do
not allow an internal train of thought to occur, more often
than not observe activation in the DMN (e.g. Mason et al.,
2007)2.
Perhaps the most important implication of the current
hypothesis is that it offers anexplanation for theanticorrelation
betweenDMNactivity and perception. Assuming that the global
workspace can only accommodate a subset of current input
streams incompatible input streams (such asmulling overwhat
I will do tomorrow versus paying attention to what I am doing
now) could not both be processed in great detail. As global
availability ‘amplifies’ relevant streams over irrelevant streams,
theprocess of competition combinedwith subsystem inhibition
would ensure that fundamentally incompatible input streams
are anticorrelated over time3. In the proposed architecture,
therefore, the anticorrelation between the DMN and the DAN
emerges naturally from the competition between different
input streams for the limited capacity of the global workspace
architecture (e.g. the FPN). Given that the stimulus-independent
nature of DMN activity is its most intriguing feature, under-
standing whether the accompanying sensory neglect arises in
part due to interaction with the global workspacewill constrain
how the DMN's role in waking thought is understood.Acknowledgments
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